**Course Business**

- **Course Textbook:**
  - amazon.ca or OC Bookstore
  - Nietzsche book (on-order in OC Bookstore)

- **POP Quizzes:**
  - Start next week!
Outsider's Opinion of Philosophy:

"many man, under the influence of science or practical affairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible."

Why might this be so?

"The butter caused Mary's belief. Had it not been there reflecting light or doing other buttery things, Mary would not have formed her confidence that it was there" (Simon Blackburn, “Julius Caesar and George Berkeley Play Leap Frog”).

Philosophy aims at knowledge

Philosophical answers are not demonstrably true

Not about indubitable knowledge

Asking question — exploring the bounds of knowledge
SUCCESS IN PHILOSOPHY

Not quite...
Little success compared to SCIENCECORP

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY precursor of SCIENCECORP

“Thus, to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions that are capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy.”

So... Why Study Philosophy?

Why not?
**RUSSELL, “WHAT IS THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY?”**

“Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy: Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.”

**EMPirical Knowledge**

Common sense view on perception + knowledge

Empiricism — knowledge derives from experience

Certain knowledge of present experiences?

Russell’s Hypothesis: statements about immediate experiences likely to be wrong
  - Reasonable to double self-evident perceptions
Empiricism’s Veil of Perception

**Question:** Defect, Limitation, or Reality?

Sense Data → Sensations

- **Sense Data** = immediate sensory impression/experience
- **Sensation** = idea derived from past/present sensory impression/experience
**ALTERNATIVE: NAIVE REALISM**

**CREEDO:** Things are as they appear!*

**CRAZY TOWN:** What about "bent" rulers in water?!
Tendency to “believe” or “think” that the table is really one uniform colour.

Appearance vs. Reality Distinction
- Table “appears” to be variations of some colour.
- Table is “really” one uniform colour.

Question: If no (one/uniform) colour appears to be the colour of the table, why is any one specific colour any “more real” than any other?

Colour is not inherent in the object.

**Fun Fact:** Majority of scientists say objects are not “coloured” (in ordinary sense)!

Colour depends on a relationship between the perceiver and the object (and the environment).

**Ordinary Language:** “the colour” of “the table” =
- “the sort of colour which it will seem to have to a normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual conditions of light.”
**Table Example**

**Perspectives and Points of View**

Human Eyes (1x magnification)
Microscopic (1000x magnification)
Quantum (n-x magnification)

**So... why privilege the human perspective as "more real" than any other perspective?**

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**Table Example**

**Shape of the Table**

- table "appears: to be a diamond shape
  (from a certain angle)
- table "really" is a rectangle

Different points of view = different shapes

**Question:** Why is any specific point of view any "more real" than any other point of view?

**Russell’s Conclusion**

Construct the “real” table from the “apparent” table
- Drawing inferences from what we see
**TABLE EXAMPLE**

"thus the various sensations due to various pressures or various parts of the body cannot be supposed to reveal directly any definite property of the table, but at most to be signs of some property which perhaps causes all the sensations, but is not actually apparent in any of them. And the same applies still more obviously to the sounds which can be elicited by rapping the table" (Russell p. 413).

Experience the **effect** (i.e., "a sign") of some property, sensation does not reveal property itself

Properties of objects **cause** a sensation

Example: Cats **feel** fluffy; not that cats **are** (in reality) fluffy

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**APPEARANCE v. REALITY**

"Thus it becomes evident that the **real table**, if there is one, is **not the same as what we immediately experience** by sight or touch or hearing. The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but **must be an inference from what is immediately known**" (Russell, p. 413).
**Challenge of Idealism**

Idealism — objects of knowledge depend on the mind - all that exists are minds + ideas

Berkeley's Contribution: able to deny the existence of matter without absurdity

Why?

If secondary qualities (e.g., colour, sound, smell, etc.) depend on the perceiver, why do primary qualities (e.g., shape, size, solidity, etc.) not depend on the perceiver?

Think: Can you conceive of a "colourless" shape?

\[
P1: \text{The existence of secondary qualities depends on the perceiver} \\
P2: \text{Inconceivable to think of primary qualities independently of secondary qualities} \\
P3: \text{Existence primary qualities, therefore, also depends on the perceiver} \\
P4: \text{If primary qualities are representations of "matter," then "matter" is only a series of ideas} \\
P5: \text{Primary qualities are representations of "matter"} \\
P6: \text{Therefore, "matter" is only a collection "idea"} \\
P7: \text{Therefore, there is not "external world" made of matter, and the world is only a collection of ideas perceived by other minds}
\]
George Berkeley, *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous* (pp. 416-428)